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1 Wright, Teresa, Accepting Authoritarianism: State-society Relations in China’s Reform
Era, Stanford, Stanford UP, 2010, 254 pp.
2 Teresa Wright contends that all China’s diverse economic strata succeed by relying on
the  state.  Therefore,  they  are  not  about  to  turn  against  their  government.  They
“accept”  the  CCP because  of  how late  industrialisation,  state-led  development,  and
socialist legacies combine to shape opinion.
3 Wright’s choice of strata leads to a vision of China as half an onion, with only a few at
the  top  and  most  people  at  the  bottom,  mainly  workers  and  farmers.  In  contrast,
Chinese sociologists include strata of unemployed and under-employed and see them as
the  narrow  bottom  of  an  olive-shaped  society  whose  middle  class  should  keep
expanding. Wright never discusses why her approach to economic strata is superior, as
it well may be, to that of Chinese government analysts.
4 Wright  makes  her  argument  by  synthesising  surveys,  interviews,  and  statistics
developed  by  the  leading scholars  of  contemporary  China.  As  a  knowledgeable
researcher, she puts her findings in comparative perspectives with early democratisers
and late developers. Her important work merits grappling with. I learned something
new from her on virtually every page.
5 Many analysts, however, see President Hu Jintao’s stress on reducing inequality as a
response to the regime's sense that people were no longer accepting the Party. So far,
despite President Hu’s measures, inequality has continued to worsen. In addition, in
contrast to Wright’s view, in which all strata accept the regime in the late reform era,
many analysts find China’s awesome dynamism unleashing such out-of-control forces
that  the  future  is  wide  open.  The  future  then  is  not  a  matter  of  late  reform  era
continuity.
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6 Her over-arching thesis  about acceptance is  a  bit  fuzzy.  Given that “acceptance” at
times means mere toleration of the regime or a self-interested unwillingness at the
moment to challenge the strong state, Wright cannot say how long “acceptance” will
last. Minxin Pei sees China on the verge of explosions from below. Jinghao Zhou sees
party decay as the CCP's future. Personally, I doubt that the future can be known. I
expect it to surprise us.
7 This  is  not  to  suggest  that  the  CCP  regime  is  illegitimate.  But  Pyongyang  is  also
legitimate. Given the disastrous nature of the DPRK economy, Wright’s insistence that
economic  factors  explain  why the  Beijing  government  is  acceptable  to  the  Chinese
people  seems  strange.  Both  regimes,  and  Vietnam,  established  strong  nationalist
legitimacy by fighting wars against so-called imperialists.
8 To  project  a  nation’s  future,  one  cannot  merely  explore,  as  Wright  does,  socio-
economic  factors.  The  state  is  a  semi-autonomous entity,  not  just  a  superstructure
reflecting the interests of an economic base. After all, China’s economy in the reform
era is a world away from that of the Mao era, and yet the CCP continues to hold a
monopoly of political power.
9 Party power-holders in China have often declared that corruption could undermine
their government. Wright’s excellent work documents that cruel corruption. A survey
not cited by Wright shows Chinese having more respect for prostitutes than for Party
officials.  When the state has sentenced to death a citizen who has murdered a CCP
official or killed a police officer, a popular outcry has arisen on behalf of the murderer
of the representative of the state. Does “acceptance” capture all key popular passions
about the political system?
10 Despite the academic notion of two major Party factions in China, the popular view is
that  every  Party  power-holder  is  his  own  faction.  Each  serves  mainly  himself,  his
family, and his networks. As in 1989, Chinese see the wealth of the powerful as coming
from  these  supposed  “servants  of  the  people  swallow[ing]  all  the  surplus  value
produced by the people’s sweat and blood.”
11 People  do  not  find  Party  leaders  making  a  serious  effort  to  tame  the  monstrous
corruption. Instead, the regime treats corruption as an inevitable price of the economic
transition,  which  will  become  manageable  once  China  has  modernised.  The  party
centre, after all, did not publicise the anti-corruption Chongqing experience, despite
the popularity of that effort to smash the mafia and expose the criminality of the police
and  judicial  systems.  When  a  leader  is  charged  with  corruption,  Chinese  cynically
comment that the accuser is as corrupt as the accused, that the accused is merely the
target of factional strife. Does “acceptance” capture Chinese attitudes toward the CCP?
12 High levels of the regime are concerned about CCP ossification. That is, as in the case of
the post-Khrushchev USSR, entrenched interests are blocking necessary change. They
resist attempts to cool down property bubbles when such policies get in the way of self-
enrichment in shady land deals. Violent struggles over land occur daily throughout the
nation.
13 Wright’s economistic approach does not address inner party tensions that arise from
corruption, ossification, popular rage, and violent struggles over land. But there are
indications that reactionary forces in the regime have concluded that a corrupt China
needs  to  be  purified  by  emulating  supposedly  clean  and  healthy  models  of  moral
superiority such as North Korea, Che Guevara, and Mao Zedong. Wright quotes without
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comment a Chinese analyst who sees China today looking ever more like “Germany
before World War Two.”
14 Ignoring the possibility that China’s extreme and intensifying economic polarisation
might be related to un-restrained greed within the Party system, Wright attributes the
gross inequality to late industrialisation that empowers neo-liberal forces, a peculiar
term to apply to China’s statist mercantilism. China’s New Left describes the country’s
problems  as  rooted  in  neo-liberalism  to  hide  the  real  root  of  the  difficulties:  the
unaccountable interests of the Party dictatorship. 
15 Wright  cites  early  twenty-first  century  data  showing  that  seven  out  of  20
entrepreneurs  are  Party  members,  compared  with  only  one  in  20  of  the  total
population. The relevant comparison, however, contrasts independent entrepreneurs
who do not come from Party families with the working-age population. Because power
turns into wealth in CCP China, the vast majority of the rich have become so because
they held Party power or family members did. Independent entrepreneurs are actually
mistrusted by the Party. Such business people often try to keep a distance from the
Party  because  they  hate  being  ripped  off  by  the  corrupt  CCP.  Independent
entrepreneurs  actually  experience  discrimination,  rather  than  being  favoured  as
Wright contends.
16 The “late industrialisation” that concerns Wright begins only “in the 1960s.” But China
rose by copying from and plugging into post-WW II Asia-Pacific economic dynamism,
which also was not neo-liberal. Japan and the four Asian Tigers rose through the use of
state-led development instruments  because all  could take advantage of  post  WW II
factors, a strong US dollar, a US market open to foreign exports, and the pro-growth
institutions  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system.  So  could  China.  Wright’s  notion  of  late
industrialisation beginning in the 1960s, precisely when Fordist economics began to
give way to a new economy of services and knowledge, usually called post-industrial, is
mystifying.
17 Wright’s description of a healthy socialist legacy is even more confusing. A socialist
agenda would  emanate  from unions  organised  by  workers  and by  a  political  party
responsive to union pressures and concerned about economic fairness. Socialism would
not  act  detrimentally  toward  the  poor.  The  rich-poor  gap  would  not  be  growing.
Socialism  therefore  has  little  to  do  with  the  PRC  era  dictatorship,  which  is  quite
rightist.
18 In Mao era China, villagers were locked up in the countryside in an Apartheid manner
using the internal passports of the hukou system.1 They could not move to the cities in
search  of  better-paying  jobs.  Urban  workers  monopolised  those  jobs  and  their
privileges. Urbanites considered “smelly” peasants a lesser race to whom one would
not wish to marry one’s daughter. Poor villagers were imagined as lazy and thieving.
19 Urban  state  workers  were what  Lenin  dubbed  a  labour  aristocracy.  These  were
feudalistic  tendencies.  From  1949  on,  no  national  health  care  system  offered  the
nation’s  majority  living  in  villages  the  coverage  of  state  workers,  including  the
aristocracy of labour.
20 Today, this labour aristocracy is nostalgic about the “socialism” of the Mao era. This so-
called socialist legacy re-appears in continuing Apartheid efforts against rural migrants
in the cities.
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21 Write refers to this subsidised and privileged life of Mao era state workers as the lived
experience  of  socialism.  It  certainly  may  be  a  way  for  former  state  enterprise
employees  to  complain  about  the  reform  era  policy  of  making  enterprises  self-
sustainingly profitable by closing money-losing firms and laying off redundant staff.
22 But  the  lived  experience  of  socialism  includes  stagnant  miseries  --  low  wages,
scarcities,  ration  coupons,  long  lines,  and  a  joyless  culture  that  took  away  the
happiness and deep meaning of sacred moments of family and calendar, from marriage
to New Year. Maoist socialism was inherently inhuman in quotidian ways, even if it had
not also, in its most extreme practices, killed 40 million or so and shattered the lives of
many  tens  of  millions  more.  The  reform  era's  trains  packed  with  working  people
heading home during an extended New Year vacation and not locked out of family, in
contrast to the Mao era's total control of residence and travel, is a measure of the far
greater humanity inherent in the reform era’s return of Chineseness.
23 In the Mao era,  the socialist  state determined where one lived and worked.  People
described themselves as turnips painfully trapped in cracks in the pavement. Careers
open to  talent  in  the post-Mao era,  in  contrast,  are  usually  considered anti-feudal,
progressive, and liberating reforms. But what Wright describes is a negative: people
now “had to fend for themselves.” She will not acknowledge the huge rise in human
dignity  facilitated  by  post-Mao  policies  that  greatly  expand  personal  freedoms,
allowing people to travel, worship as they please, and plan their own and their family’s
futures.
24 Wright instead touts Mao era superiorities. She often cites the low Gini coefficient of
pre-reform China as proof that socialism was egalitarian. But in the socialist era, which
abolished money and market, power was all-determining. Inequality was absolute. It
was a matter of life and death. In Mao’s Leap famine, those connected to Party power
usually survived. The powerless died in the tens of millions.
25 Whereas  Wright  claims that  early  post-Mao reforms “led to  a  dramatic  increase  in
socio-economic inequality,”  in fact,  all  data show that policies privileging the rural
poor dramatically narrowed the urban-rural gap between 1979 and 1984. Given that
Lula in Brazil, another late industrialiser, has actually decreased inequality, the real
source of growing inequality in China is not, as Wright wrongly claims, an economistic
abstraction  known  as  late  industrialisation,  but  rather  the  policies,  interests,  and
institutions of China’s Party dictatorship.
26 In sum, Wright’s categories -- late (neo-liberal) industrialisation, statist development,
and socialist legacies -- are notions that obscure the political sources of both better and
worse,  awesome growth  and  personal  freedom,  gross  inequality  and  pervasive
corruption.  People  in  power  in  Beijing  today  may,  from  Wright’s  perspective,  be
paranoid  to  fear  volcanic  explosions  from  below.  Wright  may  be  correct  that  the
Chinese people “accept” their government. But that is not all they do. I suspect that it
is the factors sketched above, and not Wright’s late reform continuities, that better
explain why China’s future will be full of wrenching surprises.
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NOTES
1.  See for example: Qin Hui, "Zhongzu geli shidai de Nanfei liudong gongren" (Migrant workers
in  South  Africa  during  the  Apartheid  era),  Nanfang  dushi  bao,  20  January  2010.  Available
via: http://new.21ccom.net/plus /view.php?aid=6727# (editor’s note). 
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